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Kingyo International's Failure to Disclose Important Information Before Franchise Contract Signing in Violation of Fair Trade Act

The FTC decided at the 1153rd Commissioners' Meeting on Dec. 11, 2013 that the failure of Kingyo International Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Kingyo International) to fully disclose important franchise information in writing before signing franchise contracts with its trading counterparts was obviously unfair conduct likely to affect trading order in the franchise market in violation of Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act. The FTC therefore imposed on the company an administrative fine of NT$500,000.

The FTC's investigation revealed that Kingyo International had not only failed to fully disclose the concrete items of various pieces of capital equipment and the remodeling project, the expenses and specifications (such as dimensions, brands, model numbers, etc.), but also increased the expenses for remodeling, wiring and plumbing work and equipment on franchisees immediately after the completion of the remodeling project. It should have fully disclosed the concrete items, costs and specifications of the capital equipment and remodeling project and provided the names of engineering agents in advance. Moreover, by using transportation cost considerations as an excuse, Kingyo International also refused to ship out supplies unless the raw materials or products ordered by its franchisees achieved certain amounts and at the same time established penalty regulations to be imposed on the franchisees to facilitate its management. Since such practices were in fact restrictions in the franchise relations, Kingyo International had the responsibility to

disclose such information to its franchisee before the contract was signed. Meanwhile, Kingyo International also did not disclose the monthly marketing expense required or provide the statistics on the ratios of contract cancellation and termination in the previous year.

The aforesaid information was an important matter of concern both to potential franchisees and future business operators. It was also what they needed to assess whether they would establish such franchise relationships or select other franchisers. The failure of Kingyo International to fully disclose such information was likely to result in the potential franchisees' incorrect judgment that would affect trading order. Kingyo International's failure to fully disclose in writing to trading counterparts the expenses required before a franchisee began operation and during operation (expenses for capital equipment and the remodeling project, the various items and the monthly advertising expense), the statistics on contract cancellation and termination in the same franchise system in all counties/cities in the previous year, specifications of capital equipment and remodeling work and the names of engineering agents, items and quantities of products or raw materials to be ordered, and related penalties before the contract was signed had violated Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act. The FTC therefore acted according to Article 36 of the Enforcement Rules to the Fair Trade Act and imposed on Kingyo International an administrative fine of NT$500,000.

The FTC Approves Microsoft-Nokia Merger with Conditions Attached

The FTC decided at the 1163rd Commissioners' Meeting on Feb. 19, 2014 that the merger between Microsoft Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Microsoft) and Nokia Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Nokia) would not cause any significant change to the relevant market or lessen the competition therein and, therefore, there was no need to prohibit the merger according to Article 12 (1) of the Fair Trade Act. However, to ensure that the overall economic benefit would be greater than the disadvantages from the competition restrictions thereof incurred, the FTC acted according to Article 12 (2) of the Fair Trade Act and attached two conditions, namely "When licensing its intelligent mobile device patents, Microsoft may not make any inappropriate price decisions or adopt discriminatory treatment to restrict the freedom of intelligent mobile device manufacturers to choose their mobile operating systems" and "Nokia shall adopt fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms when licensing its standard-essential patents and also ensure that any enterprise acquiring any of its standard-essential patents will abide by the aforesaid terms if Nokia should assign such patents to other enterprises."

According to the company share and asset transaction contract established between Microsoft and Nokia on Sep. 2, 2013, Microsoft would be assigned most of the business and assets of Nokia's device and service departments, including the design teams of these departments, all the production equipment, business operations, sales, marketing activities, support functions, and the patents for new products developed by these departments. Nokia would give Microsoft non-exclusive licenses for its patents for ten years but Microsoft would retain the option to extend such licenses for good. Meanwhile, Microsoft would provide Nokia's HERE Department (digital map and positioning services) with reciprocal licensing.

The transaction between Microsoft and Nokia met the merger description set forth in Subparagraph 3 of Article 6 (1) of the Fair Trade Act, plus Microsoft's Windows operating systems already accounted for one quarter of the PC operating system market share whereas the total sales of Microsoft and Nokia in the country in the previous fiscal year had also achieved the merger filing threshold announced by the FTC; the two companies therefore filed the merger notification with the FTC.

During the reviewing process, the FTC solicited the opinions of several domestic mobile device manufacturers, the competent authority the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Industrial Technology Research Institute and the Institute for Information Industry about the merger. Google and Samsung also presented their statements as interested parties. In addition, on Feb. 11, 2014, the FTC also invited the merging parties, domestic mobile device manufacturers, interested parties, scholars and specialists, and the competent authority of the industry to attend a colloquium.

Microsoft's operations that were related to the merger involved the development of and licensing the Windows Phone mobile operating system, while Nokia's consisted of the production of mobile devices. Therefore, the case was a vertical merger. According to the FTC's assessment of competition restrictions

likely to result from the vertical merger, the possibility of Microsoft stopping licensing the Windows Phone to competitors in the downstream market after the merger was extremely small because Windows Phone accounted for only 3.4% of the global smartphone market share and merely 2.2% of the domestic market. Meanwhile, Google's Android system, accounting for a market share of nearly 80%, was another option for consumers. In addition, Microsoft's intention in acquiring Nokia's devices and services departments was to become the third ecosystem after Apple iOS and Google Android. For this reason, it had to extend the installed base of the Windows Phone as much as possible. Under such circumstances, the possibility of Microsoft stopping licensing the Windows Phone to other mobile device manufacturers to shut out downstream competitors had to be small.

Previously, Microsoft had adopted the excuse that the Android system involved a number of Microsoft's patents and started in 2010 to sign the "Android Licensing Agreement" with mobile device manufacturers using the Android system and charged them a licensing fee according to the quantity of Android mobile devices produced. Several mobile device manufacturers thought Microsoft might increase the licensing fee after the merger in order to push up the production costs of mobile device manufacturers using the Android system. After assessment, the FTC believed that Microsoft would possess its own device manufacturing department after the merger and its dependence on other mobile device manufacturers would decrease. This could indeed serve as an incentive for the company to bring up the "Android Licensing Agreement" fee on the one hand to entice mobile device manufacturers to forgo the Android system and switch to the Windows Phone, and on the other hand such a practice would increase the licensing fee cost for mobile device manufacturers sticking to the Android system and achieve the purpose of pushing up the business costs of downstream competitors. Due to such considerations, the FTC therefore decided to attach the condition that Microsoft could not make any inappropriate price decisions or adopt discriminatory treatment to restrict the freedom of intelligent mobile device manufacturers to choose their mobile operating systems.



Meanwhile, the assignment of Nokia's mobile devices and services business to Microsoft would change the balance originally existing in the mobile device patent licensing market. Nokia would retain its principal mobile device patents without engaging in the production of mobile devices and consequently would not have to worry about getting sued for patent infringement. There would also be no need for the company to engage in cross-licensing with other mobile device manufacturers. As a result, Nokia could increase the licensing fees on mobile device manufacturers using its standard-essential patents to jack up the production costs of such manufacturers as well as the prices of their products. Such an outcome would belong to the range of disadvantages from competition restrictions resulting from mergers and the FTC therefore attached the condition that Nokia had to adopt fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms when licensing its standard-essential patents and also ensure that any enterprise acquiring any of its standard-essential patents would abide by the aforesaid terms if Nokia should assign such patents to other enterprises.

An Analysis of Price Adjustments in the Domestic Petroleum Product Wholesale Market from the Aspect of Monopolization

The legislative purpose of competition law is to increase market efficiency and protect consumers' interests. At present, there are only two upstream suppliers, namely, Chinese Petroleum Corporation and Formosa Petrochemical Corporation, in the domestic petroleum product wholesale market. Do price adjustments made by these two enterprises reflect joint monopolization or abuse by monopolistic businesses? This has been a focus of concern in various sectors.

According to the gas station ratio statistics released by the Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, on Mar. 31, 2014, Chinese Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter referred to as CPC) accounted for 78.96% of the petroleum product market share and Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FPC) for 21.04%. The market is apparently an oligopolistic one. Since petroleum is an indispensable element in economic development and various petroleum products are consumed in industrial manufacturing and everyday life, the stable supply-demand and pricing of petroleum products have always been the focus of concern in various sectors. After CPC was established in 1946, the prices of petroleum products in the country were determined by the government until 1993 when the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced the formulas for petroleum product price setting while in Jan. 2007 the floating gas price mechanism was officially implemented. However, a particular procedure seems to be adopted in the current gasoline pricing strategies of CPC and FPC. Usually, CPC announces its price adjustment first and FPC decides whether to follow suit. This has created doubt in various sectors over whether the conduct of the two enterprises is in fact similar to joint monopolization.

Actual Difference in Product Prices of Wholesale Petroleum

CPC and FPC announce their wholesale gasoline and diesel price adjustments each week. The final wholesale prices for gas station operators, however, are not the same when the quantity discounts and performance incentives set forth in petroleum product supply contracts are taken into consideration. Meanwhile, consumers can also choose their trading counterparts, the time to purchase gasoline and the way they make payment in accordance with the promotion schemes of different gas station operators.

Since the Operating Guidelines for the Floating Adjustment of Gasoline and Diesel Prices were officially implemented in Jan. 2007, the said Guidelines have been adopted by domestic gasoline and diesel product wholesalers and retailers as an important basis in their price adjustments as the FTC has observed from the adjusted amounts, times of adjustment announcements and times that such adjustments take effect over the years.

However, the findings of the FTC's investigation have indicated that the quantity discounts and performance incentives set forth in petroleum product supply contracts signed by CPC and FPC with gas station operators are also adjusted during different contract

periods. As a consequence, the average wholesale price for different gas station operators therefore also varies.

The promotion schemes adopted by gas station operators include cash payment discounts, discounts for members paying with credit cards, membership card bonus point accumulation, special offers for co-branded credit cards, special offers for regular credit cards, and giveaways. The dates and approaches of such promotion schemes are different and, as a result, the average retail price of petroleum products sold to consumers by each gas station operator therefore differs.

Should CPC and FPC be Regarded as Monopolistic Enterprises?

Currently, CPC and FPC are the two only businesses engaging in refining and the wholesale distribution of petroleum products. They account for 100% of the domestic gasoline and diesel product wholesale markets. In other words, CPC and FPC together claim at least two thirds of the domestic gasoline and diesel markets. The total sales of each company exceeded NT$1 billion in 2012. Hence, according to Article 5 (2) of the Fair Trade Act and Article 3 of the Enforcement Rules to the Fair Trade Act, CPC and FPC are monopolistic businesses as described in the Fair Trade Act and should be subject to the regulations set forth in the subparagraphs of Article 10 of the Fair Trade Act.

Does Price Adjustment Involve Abuse of Market Status by Monopolistic Enterprises?

Monopolistic pricing refers to a monopolistic supplier utilizing its dominating market status to pursue maximum profit while its trading counterparts at various production and marketing levels have no alternative options. Setting overly high or low product or service prices is an abuse of market status by a monopolistic supplier. Since the oil refining industry is characterized by economies of scale and economies of scope and is subject to the strategic petroleum reserve and petroleum fund appropriation regulations set forth in the Petroleum Administration Act, the level of entry barriers and market concentration are high. Although previously there was ESSO Taiwan importing ESSO petroleum products into Taiwan to compete, this company has already pulled out of the market. Moreover, the products of CPC and FPC are highly homogeneous and there is not enough flexibility in the supply and demand. Therefore, CPC and FPC have continued their oligopolization in the petroleum supply market. In the foreseeable future, no enterprises should be interested in engaging in petroleum refining or wholesale business.

CPC started to implement the Operating Guidelines for Floating Adjustment of Gasoline and Diesel Prices in Jan. 2007 after the Ministry of Economic Affairs presented the said guidelines to the Executive Yuan and they were approved by the Financial Advisory Group of the Executive Yuan. Petroleum price adjustments require the approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Each price adjustment has to be filed with the Ministry of Economic Affairs in advance and CPC also has to present a price comparison table for each adjustment, the basis of the price calculation for the adjustment, crude oil prices, prices of crude oil shipments received in the month, estimated earnings, and a comparison of post-adjustment prices with those of other countries in Asia to the State-owned Enterprise Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Bureau of Energy. Therefore, the appropriateness of CPC's price adjustments and control of earnings are under the supervision of the competent authorities. CPC cannot adjust product prices according to its management conditions like a private enterprise. There is a considerable amount of administrative control. Even though FPC also acts according to the floating petroleum price adjustment mechanism as it adjusts its gasoline and diesel prices, it is not the same as a monopolistic enterprise using its dominating market status to push up prices for unlawful monopolistic profit.

The gasoline and diesel price calculation adopted

by CPC and FPC is based on the ratio of the output value of each product to the output value of the entire range of products. Presently, there are no other better calculation formulas that comply with accounting principles and that have been adopted by petroleum suppliers in other countries or regions. Furthermore, CPC's financial statements for each year have to be reviewed by the National Audit Office of the Control Yuan whereas FPC's annual financial statements require certification by certified public accountants. There has been no concrete evidence to prove that CPC and FPC have intentionally raised the prices of gasoline and diesel products to increase the ratio of such products in the output value of their total products to cope with excessively high management costs or have manipulated statistics to reflect business losses in gasoline and diesel product sales. In addition, investigations show that the domestic gasoline and diesel product sales profit rates of both CPC and FPC in 2011 and 2012 were negative. For this reason, it is difficult to conclude that the pricing practices of the said petroleum suppliers are carried out to pursue unlawful monopolistic profit.

Conclusion

According to the findings of investigations and opinions from scholars and specialists, leading theories on oligopolistic market prices suggest that under the premise of high homogeneity in the gasoline and diesel products sold in the country and with FPC pursuing maximum profit and eventually ending up pricing its products in line with those of CPC, the FTC has found it difficult to conclude that the gasoline and diesel price adjustments of CPC and FPC have been in violation of the Fair Trade Act.



The petroleum markets in the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the EU are all oligopolistic. Regardless of whether the changes in petroleum product costs are the same, the petroleum price adjustment process indicates that leading suppliers decide their price adjustment margins and other suppliers follow suit. The adjustment margin of suppliers following suit does not have much to do with their management costs. They merely act according to the adjustments made by the leading suppliers. Hence, that the adjustments made by CPC and FPC on their gasoline and diesel products are consistent is no exception.

Price Restriction Imposed by Digilion Inc. in Violation of Fair Trade Act

The FTC decided at the 1164th Commissioners' Meeting on Feb. 26, 2014 that Digilion Inc. had violated Article 18 of the Fair Trade Act for stipulating in the distributor contract signed with distributors for the company's ATM chip readers provisions regarding penalties to be imposed on distributors that failed to sell the products in accordance with the retail prices set by the company. The restriction deprived the distributors of their freedom to determine their prices and also lessened intra-brand price competition between different marketing channels. In addition to ordering Digilion Inc. to immediately cease the unlawful act, the FTC also imposed on the company an administrative fine of NT$50,000.

A price list was attached to the "distributor contract" signed between Digilion Inc. and its distributors and it was specified in the contract that distributors failing to adopt the prices would be subject to compensation for breach of contract, supply discontinuation, or distributorship cancellation. The price quotation forms used between Digilion Inc. and the distributors also carried wording stating that "Distributors must sell the products in accordance with the prices set by the company."

When discovering distributors or retailers selling its products at prices too low, Digilion Inc. would first request that their upstream distributors to pass on the message that if they refused to make price changes, Digilion would request that the upstream distributors retrieve the products in order to maintain the prices of the company's products in the market. In fact, the company had indeed sent emails to online sellers marketing its products at prices below what were specified in the price list. Meanwhile, a number of distributors also pointed out that compliance with the prices established by the company had restricted their business operations. In other words, the practice had exerted psychological pressure on the distributors and forced them to accept the said restriction so that the maintenance of retail prices could be achieved. The conduct was in violation of Article 18 of the Fair Trade Act.

False Advertising by U-Mall in Violation of Fair Trade Act

The FTC decided at the 1150th Commissioners' Meeting on Nov. 21, 2013 that the advertisement for "Miao Zhu Fu Legendary Tangerine Extract Stain Remover" (hereinafter referred to as the product of concern) posted on the U-Mall Shopping website by U-Mall Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as U-Mall) and Jia Hong Enterprise Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Jia Hong Enterprise) was a false, untrue and misleading representation with regard to quality of product in violation of Article 21 (1) of the Fair Trade Act. The FTC imposed an administrative fine of NT$50,000 on each of the two companies.

The advertisement posted on the U-Mall Shopping website by U-Mall and Jia Hong Enterprise gave the impression that the product of concern could remove soy sauce, grease and stains on kitchen blower filters, window screens and textiles faster than other similar products. Although Jia Hong Enterprise presented

the results of tests on the capacity of the product of concern for removing soy sauce stains conducted by SGS Taiwan Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as SGS Taiwan) as well as data on the grease-dissolving and cleaning effects of the components (Carboxymethyl Cellulose, for example) of the product of concern, SGS Taiwan indicated that the tests conducted were only related to the soy sauce stain-removing capacity of the product of concern and no comparison was made with similar products from other makers. In addition, the component data provided could not support the effects of the product of concern as claimed in the advertisement. Therefore, the advertisement for the product of concern posted by U-Mall and Jia Hong Enterprise on the U-Mall Shopping website was a false, untrue and misleading representation with regard to quality of product in violation of Article 21 (1) of the Fair Trade Act.

False Advertising by Taiwan Optical Platform in Violation of Fair Trade Act

The FTC decided at the 1159th Commissioners' Meeting on Jan. 22, 2014 that the wording of "Ha Net Broadband the Lowest Rates" posted by Taiwan Optical Platform Cable TV Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan Optical Platform) on its website was a false, untrue and misleading representation with regard to price of service in violation of Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act and Paragraph 1 of the same article was applicable mutatis mutandis. The FCT imposed on the company an administrative fine of NT$50,000.

Taiwan Optical Platform advertised its Ha Net Broadband service as "no 2-year contract, no line charge and unlimited hours - the lowest rates." In



reality, the annual fee for 20M/3M was NT$7,200 (NT$600 per month) and subscribers also had the option of paying NT$3,900 for six months (NT$650 per month). The advertisement gave the impression that the charge for the broadband connection service provided by Taiwan Optical Platform was the lowest in the same region. However, the annual rate for 30M/3M broadband connection offered by Taiwan Optical Platform's competitor VeeTime Corp. was only NT$579 per month and subscribers had the option to pay NT$599 per month by paying every six months. Both rates were lower than the offers by Taiwan Optical Platform. Therefore, the wording of "lowest rates" posted in the advertisement was a false, untrue and misleading representation.

Statistics on Complaint Cases

The term “complaint” refers to a concrete statement presented in writing (including email or fax) or orally by an informer to the Fair Trade Commission or a government agency about an activity suspected of being in violation of the Fair Trade Act. Between Jan. and Mar. 2014, the FTC received 334 complaints, reviewed 547 complaint cases (including 213 unclosed cases from 2013) and closed 388 cases. From 1992 when the FTC was created until the end of Mar. 2014, the FTC received and processed 30,953 complaint cases in total, averaging 116 cases per month (Table 1).

Table 1 Complaint Cases Processed

Unit: case

Year	Number of Cases Processed	Number of Cases Processed per Month	Handling Results					
			Total	Sanctioned	Not Sanctioned	Administrative Disposal	Review Terminated	Processed with Other Cases
Total	30,953	116	30,794	2,958	6,100	348	19,359	2,029
1992-2007	21,669	113	21,348	2,286	4,183	320	13,027	1,532
2008	1,404	117	1,477	101	353	2	967	54
2009	1,402	117	1,456	140	352	3	909	52
2010	1,206	101	1,243	109	291	1	793	49
2011	1,362	114	1,346	110	278	15	898	45
2012	1,955	163	1,895	86	316	6	1,340	147
2013	1,621	135	1,641	102	276	1	1,158	104
Jan.-Mar. 2014	334	111	388	24	51	-	267	46

Notes:

1. “Administrative disposal” refers to administrative measures taken, such as warnings (or correction orders) to the industry or warnings (or written requests for improvement) issued by the FTC or requests made to the competent authorities to take necessary action.
2. “Review terminated” means the review was discontinued because the case did not belong to the jurisdiction of the FTC or was transferred to be processed by another agency after the FTC consulted with the agency or there was procedural inconsistency such as data incompleteness or that the informer could not be contacted.
3. “Processed with other cases” means the case was consolidated with other cases as a result of the same informer's repeated complaints about the same fact or different informers complaining about the same fact.

Fig. 1 Types of Cases in Which the Review Was Terminated
(1992 to end of Mar. 2014)



Among the 388 cases closed between Jan. and Mar. 2014, 24 were concluded as involving unlawful practices and sanctioned, no sanctions were imposed in 51 cases, and the review of 267 cases was terminated. As of the end of Mar. 2014, the FTC had processed 30,794 complaint cases. Analyzed according to the handling result, sanctions were handed down in 2,958 cases (dispositions issued in 2,981 cases); no sanctions were imposed in 6,100 cases; and the review of 19,359 cases was terminated, indicating that the review of 6 in every 10 cases was terminated. Among the cases in which the review was terminated, 7,407 (38.3%) involved the jurisdiction of other agencies and 6,589 (34.0%) were procedurally inconsistent (Fig. 1).

Analyzed according to type of violation (cases involving two or more violations calculated repeatedly), among the 2,981 dispositions issued between the time the FTC was established until the end of Mar. 2014, false, untrue and misleading advertising (Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act) formed the largest proportion with 1,472 cases (about 49%), followed by 901 cases, or 30%, of deceptive or obviously unfair conduct (Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act). The total fines imposed amounted to NT$2,103.14 million. NT$874.02 million (41.6%) was imposed on businesses involved in concerted actions in violation of Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act, averaging NT$7.535 million per case, followed by the NT$387.51 million (18.4%) on businesses posting false, untrue and misleading advertisements, averaging NT$263 thousand per case, and then the NT$287.03 million (13.6%) on businesses engaging in illegal multi-level marketing practices..

Fig. 2 Numbers of Dispositions Issued -- classified by type of violation
(1992 to end of Mar. 2014)



FTC Activities in March and April 2014

- On Mar. 4, Associate Research Fellow Chien Tze-Shiou of Institutum Jurisprudentiae of Academia Sinica gave a lecture on “Infringement Law and Fair Trade” at the Competition Policy Information and Research Center at the invitation of the FTC.
- On Mar. 5, the Department of Accounting of Soochow University attended the “Fair Trade Act Training Camp” conducted by the Competition Policy Information and Research Center.
- On Mar. 20, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on Online Multi-level Marketing Operations and Related Regulations”.
- On Mar. 21, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on the Regulations in the Multi-level Marketing Supervision Act” in Kaohsiung for the southern region and also recorded the content of the presentation at the Kaohsiung Station of the Broadcasting Corporation of China.
- On Mar. 25, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on the Operations of the Taiwan International Ports Corporation and Port Service Businesses and Competition Issues” in Kaohsiung.
- On Mar. 31, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on the Regulations in the Multi-level Marketing Supervision Act” at the New Taipei City Government.
- On Apr. 18, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on the Multi-level Marketing Supervision Act and the Personal Information Protection Act” in Taichung City.
- On Apr. 24, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on Regulations for Pre-sale Home Marketing Practices” in Kaohsiung City.
- On Apr. 22, 25 and 29, the FTC conducted the “Presentation on Fair Trade Commission Regulations for the Financial Industry” respectively in Taipei City, Kaohsiung City and Taichung City.
- On Apr. 29, Assistant Professor Tzeng Hsiou-Chen of the Graduate Institute of European Studies of Tamkang University gave a lecture on the “Consolidation of Competition Laws in the European Union” at the invitation of the FTC.

1. The FTC conducting the “Presentation on the Regulations in the Multi-level Marketing Supervision Act” in Kaohsiung City for multi-level marketing businesses and the public in the southern region
2. The FTC conducting the “Presentation on the Operations of the Taiwan International Ports Corporation and Port Service Businesses and Competition Issues” in Kaohsiung
3. The FTC conducting the “Presentation on Regulations for Pre-sale Home Marketing Practices” in Kaohsiung City
4. The FTC conducting the “Presentation on Fair Trade Commission Regulations for the Financial Industry” in Taipei City

FTC International Exchanges in March and April 2014

- On Mar. 4, the FTC conducted a teleconference with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission on the FTC's adoption of the ICN merger analysis self-assessment tool.
- On Mar. 4, 13 and 18, the FTC respectively attended teleconferences held by the ICN Cartel, Unilateral Conduct and Advocacy Working Groups.
- On Mar. 25 to 28, the FTC's representatives attended the "10th Anniversary of the Centre and Conference on Cross-border Cooperation on Competition Cases" held by the OECD Korea Policy Centre in Seoul.
- On Apr. 2, 3 and 10, the FTC attended the ICN Cartel Working Group teleconference and the ICN Merger Working Group teleconference.
- On Apr. 8, Assistant Professor Mr. Alexandr Svetlicinii of the University of Macao called on the FTC and exchanged ideas on the enforcement of the Fair Trade Act in the country.
- On Apr. 23 to 25, the FTC's representative attended the 13th Annual Conference of the ICN in Marrakech, Morocco.

1. The FTC representative attending the "10th Anniversary of the Centre and Conference on Cross-border Cooperation on Competition Cases" held by the OECD Korea Policy Centre in Seoul
2. Assistant Professor Mr. Alexandr Svetlicinii of the University of Macao with Commissioner Liou Hwa-Meei during his visit to the FTC
3. The FTC Commissioner Tsai Hwei-An attending the 13th Annual Conference of the ICN in Marrakech, Morocco

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